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ABSTRACT - This paper shows that the economics of nonrival goods cannot be fully 
comprehended without taking into account the role of intelligence differences among economic agents. 
The analysis focuses on Paul Romer’s contributions and explains that the study of the economics of 
ideas (memes) through an institutional lens alone misses the crucial economic implications of the 
interplay between genes and memes. Ideas appear to be nonrival if and only to the extent that we 
neglect wide individual differences in the capacity to appropriate ideas. Differences in intelligence 
among humans make the theoretically and politically appealing non-rivalry of ideas a practical 
falsehood 
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Introduction 
This paper assumes a readership fully familiar with recent developments in new growth 
theory (Helpman, 2004) in general, and with Paul Romer’s path-breaking “Endogenous 
Technological Change” (henceforth ETC; 1990; see also Romer, 2007) in particular. Instead of 
joining the chorus of those who praise his contribution, I want to begin to outline the reasons 
that led me to believe that his theory fails to explain the totality of available evidence. I do 
not use “explanatory failure” loosely, but in the very precise sense deployed in epistemology 
(Lipton, 2004). Other things being equal, when assessing a number of competing 
explanations for a given set of phenomena, we have to rank higher that theory that best 
accounts for the whole set of phenomena to be explained. If a theory explains only part of the 
explanandum, we can say that it fails to explain, i.e. the explanans is incomplete. Very often, 
explanatory failure becomes apparent over time, as new scientific facts are uncovered. The 
addition of new facts to an old set of facts can dramatically change the kinds of inferences 
that can be drawn, a phenomenon known in meta-logic and the philosophy of reasoning as 
the non-monotonicity of induction. As it will become apparent from the references that I cite 
to support my argument, many of the facts that Romer’s theory fails to explain have been 
uncovered since the publication of ETC. This means that my analysis should be read not so 
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much as a critique, but as a challenge to Romer to adjust his theory to account for the new 
facts adduced against his hypothesis.  
Factors of production 
Instead of the old division of factors of production into labour, land, and capital, Romer 
prefers the trichotomy people-ideas-things. The advantage of this new classification is two-
fold: on the one hand, it singles out ideas as crucial to productivity; on the other hand, it 
alerts us to beware of conflating people with ideas by means of some vague phrase such as 
“human capital”. I think he could have gone farther than this, by appropriating Keith 
Stanovich’s (2004) conceptual dissection of the human subject into genes, memes (i.e. ideas; 
see Heylighen & Chielens, 2008), and the vehicle. Each and every human being is best 
conceptualized as a vehicle, a carrier that both genes and memes use to spread themselves. 
The obvious advantage of this framework consists in the insight that what makes us human 
is the result of the interplay of genes and memes, i.e. of biology and culture. Its much less 
obvious advantage derives from the insight that ideas cannot be analysed separately from 
genes, that their impact depends crucially on their match or mismatch with the genes. Romer 
missed this latter insight in a way that profoundly undermines the quality and completeness 
of his account of economic growth.  
Intelligence differences, social class, and education 
Part of the reason why humans differ from one another is genetic. If we think of an 
infant’s sex, eye colour, or hair colour, that much is unproblematic. Things become more 
political and more unpleasant when we add the mounting body of evidence (conveniently 
ignored by Heckman, 2008) from both behavioral genetics and molecular genetics that shows 
differences in IQ (Rushton & Jensen, 2005, Deary et al, 2006, Pol et al, 2006, Shaw, 2007, 
Manning, 2007, Miller & Penke, 2007, Plomin et al, 2007, Friedman et al, 2008) and creativity 
(Reuter et al, 2006, Simonton, 2007, 2008) among humans to be largely the result of different 
genetic endowments. To make things worse, IQ is significantly correlated with creativity 
(Kuncel et al, 2004, Preckel et al, 2006, Lubinski et al, 2006, Park et al, 2007, Simandan, 2008, 
Silvia, 2008), a correlation most probably explained by shared genetic factors (Chiappe & 
McDonald, 2005, Plomin et al, 2007, Cochran et al, 2007, Lynn & Kanazawa, 2008). Contrary 
to common prejudice among the social scientists, IQ is not a proxy for one’s parents’ social 
class (Gottfredson, 2009, in press; Simandan, 2009a). The correlation between a child’s IQ and 
parent’s social class found in most studies is less than 0.35, which means that 87.75% of 
variance in IQ cannot be explained by parent’s social class (a most recent study by Gale et al 
(2009) found the correlation between IQ and parent’s social class for two different British 
cohorts to be 0.25 and 0.29 only!). In other words, explanations of human inequality cannot 
simply ignore intelligence differentials by assuming that they are an epiphenomenon of the 
real cause – social class differentials.  
It is wishful thinking to assume that IQ can be boosted through education or special 
training both reliably and substantively. The reason is four-fold.  
First, scholars in the field have begun to make the distinction between IQ and rationality 
(Stanovich, 2009). The first term refers to the common source of inter-individual differences 
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in the capacity to acquire capacity. It is a complex biological property of the brain having to 
do with total brain size (Miller & Penke, 2007; r = .40-.45), volume of gray matter (Colom et 
al, 2009), properties of the white matter (Fields, 2008, Ullen, 2008), the balance between 
neural inhibition and neural excitation (Fernandez & Garner, 2007), the relative proportion of 
the types of oligodendrocytes and neurons available (Mercado, 2008), the architecture of the 
cholinergic and dopaminergic pathways, etc. The second term, rationality, refers to what lay 
people usually mean by intelligence – common sense, sound judgment, maturity, 
knowledge. Although an average IQ is a necessary condition for the acquisition of rationality 
(i.e. a behavioral repertoire of far-sighted, mature, and efficient “if-then” situation-action 
pairs), IQ alone is not a sufficient cause for rational behavior to occur (Sternberg, 2002). The 
other ingredients include personality factors and good education. Whereas rationality 
(including knowledge) can be boosted through education (Stanovich, 2009), IQ (more 
technically the g factor) is a matter of genes, epigenetic perinatal and neonatal injuries, 
nutrition, and health (Lynn, 2009). In short, rationality is social, IQ is mainly biological.  
Second, there is now convincing evidence from both third world and first world 
countries that clearly shows that: a) children’s fluid intelligence (i.e. by and large, the g 
factor) grows at the same rate regardless of whether they go to school or not (the key reference 
is Brouwers et al, 2006), and b) verbal intelligence does not increase at all with the increase in 
the number of years of education (the key references are Nie et al, 2007, and Nie & Golde, 
2008 for the data, and Jensen, 2001, for understanding why). One’s knowledge base is the 
result of the interaction between one’s IQ and one’s opportunity to learn. Because increased 
schooling means increased opportunity to learn, the common misconception that schooling 
boosts IQ can be explained as the result of 1. the conflation of IQ with knowledge/rationality, 
and 2. the deliberate forgetting that schooling can increase knowledge not via the increased 
IQ causal pathway, but via the more prosaic increased-opportunity-to-learn causal pathway 
(see also Watkins et al, 2007, Simandan, 2009a).  
Third, there is now a well-documented sad history of the failure of programs of early 
intervention for the low IQ children to generate sustained significant increases in IQ. They 
succeed in boosting IQ immediately after the end of the program, but when IQ is measured 
again several years later almost all the apparent gain is lost (the most recent serious analysis 
of these early interventions is in Murray, 2008; to be contrasted with Heckman, 2008 and his 
topic-related papers).  
Fourth, after the recent media hype about the ability of working-memory training to 
improve IQ, a number of respected scholars have begun to publish new research as well as 
re-analyses of the data from the very studies that prompted that media hype. This new, more 
rigorous wave of scholarship, casts serious doubts on the hypothesis that working-memory 
training could improve IQ scores (see Moody, 2009; Colom et al, 2010; Lövdén et al, 2010).  
The tradeoff between innovation and imitation 
Why is this evidence damaging to Paul Romer’s theory? It is damaging because he 
completely neglects the gene*meme interplay and chooses to study the economics of ideas 
through an institutional lens alone. For him, the problem of economic growth is reducible to 
the problem of how to best manage an inherent tension in the dynamics of ideas. On one 
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hand, governments should encourage invention, innovation, and creativity, and the best way 
to do this is to provide institutional incentives to the innovators (patents, copyrights, etc). On 
the other hand, governments should encourage the wide propagation of good ideas, in order 
to maximise the economic returns from them and to spur further waves of innovation. But 
the second desideratum (henceforth referred to as the imitation problem) is undermined by the 
first desideratum (henceforth referred to as the innovation problem). How can one encourage 
innovation without damaging the rate and scope of  imitation is Romer’s central research 
puzzle and so far he has attacked it by a careful analysis of the divergent logic of two key 
institutions: the market and science. He does not have yet an answer, but he does have a 
meta-answer, i.e. an answer about how the answer should be like. More precisely, he insists 
on the role of meta-ideas, i.e. generating good ideas about how best to manage the innovation-
imitation conundrum.  And I emphasised in the text “how best to manage” to bring out the 
fact that Romer sees government intervention as fundamental to economic growth.  
He also sees that the quality of the human stock is crucial, because he mentions the need 
for the government to invest in education and to give portable scholarships to talented 
youngsters interested in science and engineering. What he fails to see is that the quality of 
the (local) human stock is not a variable that governments can control via the right 
incentives. I adduced evidence showing that both creativity and IQ are largely under genetic 
control, and that they are positively correlated. Creativity is the key concept that maps into 
Romer’s innovation problem, and IQ is the key concept that maps into Romer’s imitation 
problem. Since both share common genetic variance, both of Romer’s problems drive us to 
conclude that economic prosperity at the individual level critically depends on genes (for a 
dramatic demonstration see Murray’s 2002 comparison of the incomes of siblings differing in 
IQ).  
The cognitive microfoundation of innovation 
Here is how Romer stumbles. Within the innovation problem, one cannot assume that 
more scholarships to science-inclined individuals will linearly increase the number and 
quality of innovations. The probability of significant discoveries increases with higher IQs, 
but higher IQs are very improbable. The work of Wai et al (2005), Benbow et al (2006), 
Lubinski et al (2006), and Park et al (2007) clearly shows that very high IQ individuals are 
more likely to generate patents, but very high IQs are very rare (e.g. for IQ 160, 1 in 10,000 
individuals). It is very likely that they would easily obtain some of the scholarships already 
available anyways. By generating more opportunities for scientific research (more doctoral 
fellowships, etc) the government does nothing but move the bar of selection for scholarships 
from the far-right end of the normal distribution of intelligence toward its middle. As the 
quality of the researchers decline, so does the return on investment in scientific innovation 
(as an aside, this is also the reason why scientific progress cannot naively be measured by 
number of researchers or number of publications; see also Rescher, 2006). This is not to say 
that there is nothing that governments can do to increase the number of high IQ individuals 
available. Clever schemes of immigration policy (for Canada, see Simandan & Boggs, 2007) 
can and do silently select for intelligence, fact which begins to explain both the continuing 
growth of developed countries and the increasing gap between the rich and the poor 
countries. Given that a) the key constraint on innovation is high IQ (via the correlated high 
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creativity), b) IQ is under genetic control (we have no idea whatsoever on how to increase 
one’s IQ from 115 to 160), and c) high IQ individuals are very rare, it follows that the 
innovation problem at the international level is a zero-sum game. More to the point, those 
countries that have or will acquire the largest number of very smart individuals will lead in 
technological innovation, and those countries that don’t have or lose their smart individuals 
will lag well behind. This is not a prophecy. It is what the actual data show (Dickerson, 2006, 
Jones & Schneider, 2006, Lynn & Vanhanen, 2006, Whetzel & McDaniel, 2006, Ram, 2007, 
Hunt & Wittmann, 2008, Rindermann, 2008, Gelade, 2008).  
The cognitive microfoundation of imitation 
But Romer stumbles when analysing the imitation problem as well. IQ is the single most 
important predictor of the ability to learn quickly (Duncan et al, 2008) and thoroughly 
(Kuncel et al, 2004, Deary et al, 2007). This is the same thing with the ability of a human 
vehicle (Stanovich, 2004) to download memes to her brain, or with the ability to profit from 
someone else’s ideas by appropriating them. Romer gets it wrong because he focuses on the 
misleading presumption that ideas are non-rival goods. But the abstract theoretical point that 
nothing in principle can prevent one and the same idea/meme/theory to be lodged and used 
by different brains becomes a falsehood when seen in the context of the actual cast of 
characters that make and remake the economic world. Ideas are non-rival if and only if we 
neglect wide individual differences in the capacity to appropriate ideas. Even if anybody is 
free to read a statistics textbook at the local public library, not everybody will understand its 
contents. The good is free, but just as you can’t load furniture on a bike, you can’t load 
certain ideas on low intelligence brains. Differences in intelligence among humans make the 
theoretically appealing non-rivalry of ideas a practical falsehood. But the inability of low 
intelligence brains to appropriate difficult ideas is theoretically and politically significant not 
because it falsifies Romer’s account but because it may well turn out to be the best 
explanation of human inequality we have. The crux of the matter is that the difficulty of a set 
of ideas is often correlated with its usefulness. Learning statistics is not only more difficult 
but also more socially and personally useful than learning the names of soccer players in the 
local team. The former might earn one a job, whereas the latter will at best earn one some 
cheers from onesʹ buddies. Difficult-to-master ideas/memes are more useful to those who 
master them either because a) they can be used to solve difficult real-life problems (e.g. 
statistics, see Simandan, 2010) or because b) their mastery is a difficult-to-fake indicator that 
their possessor is a smart individual (e.g. poststructuralist theory), or, more commonly 
because of a combination of the two factors (Arrow, 1973, Spence 1973, Gottfredson, 1985). 
Smart brains master difficult ideas, which means that by detecting such brains and hiring 
them one can acquire not only actual capacity (their knowledge of a set of difficult and useful 
ideas) but also potential capacity (their ability to quickly grasp and recombine other difficult 
and useful ideas). 
Intelligence-driven geographical differentiation of economic wellbeing  
Significantly, one of the best ways to gravitate towards complex ideas is to gravitate 
towards those who host those ideas, i.e. other great minds. Birds of a feather flock together 
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(Simandan, 2006, 2008, 2009a). Here we get into the geographical-economic problem of 
positive externalities of human capital, neighbourhood effects, the contagion of genius, 
knowledge spillovers – theorised by economists ever since Marshall, but in complete 
disregard of the literature on individual differences in intelligence and, even more relevant, 
of the literature of interaction effects between people of different IQs (Gordon, 1997, Day et 
al 2005, Simandan, 2006, 2008, Jeong & Chi, 2007).  
Conversely, dull brains are unappealing, and therefore poorly paid, both because the 
kinds of things they know are not particularly difficult (and hence supply is abundant) and 
because they signal that one cannot rely on their acquiring of difficult ideas in a reasonable 
time (let alone on their creative recombination of these ideas). This is the gene*meme 
interplay problem I mentioned earlier: the best minds gravitate towards the complex ideas 
and the encounter generates further great ideas, whereas the average and below-average 
minds gravitate towards trivial ideas and the encounter generates further trivialities (e.g. 
belief in God in general and religious dogmatism in particular are negatively correlated with 
IQ across countries and within countries; see Lynn et al, 2009). The economic inequality that 
ensues is the dark side of these gravitational pulls (or, more exactly, of these positive 
feedback loops). Of relevance, this inequality becomes magnified across generations via 
geographical effects, in a path-dependent manner: the smart neighbourhoods or countries 
enter a virtuous spiral of high quality knowledge spillover and economic growth; the less 
smart neighbourhoods or countries become trapped in a vicious spiral of low quality 
knowledge spillover and economic stagnation. So much for Gerschenkron’s convergence 
debate.  
Romer’s solution to economic development is to encourage innovation in developed 
countries and imitation of these innovations in third world countries. Developed countries 
can increase their innovation rate by stealing the bright brains of third world countries. What 
is left behind in the third world countries is low intelligence. The question is whether 
successful imitation can occur in these conditions (Clark, 2007, Simandan, 2009b). The 
majority of third world countries seem to have their average intelligence well below the 
Western mean (IQ 100; Rindermann, 2007). Not surprisingly, the severity of their economic 
situation is negatively correlated with their IQ (Rindermann, 2008) and Gelade’s (2008) 
analysis strongly suggests that IQ is a cause and not an effect of economic development.  
Conclusion 
I hope I have begun to sketch why Romer’s ETC is an explanatory failure and why 
economists cannot explain much about economic growth if they don’t engage with the 
scholarship on individual and national differences in intelligence. Both innovation and 
imitation are partly determined by IQ differentials both among individuals and among 
countries. Romer is to be praised for having analysed those factors other than IQ that matter; 
but he overlooked the single most important constraint to economic growth: human 
intelligence and its wide dispersion. The economics of nonrival goods must dwell on these 
cognitive microfoundations or else it will fail to deliver on its promises.  
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